and proteins should ASF be detected in the country. Additional
US products that could see exports halted are US dog and cat
food, a $1.6 billion annual market, and cattle hides, wet blue
leather, and other skins, valued at nearly $1 billion yearly.
Many US pet food products, rendered and other feed
ingredients, and hide and leather products contain no pork-origin
ingredients. Similarly, certain markets prohibit the
import of products containing pork for religious reasons.
The vast majority of these animal products that do contain
pork-origin inputs undergo processing that includes times
and temperatures recognized internationally as effective in
eliminating the ASF virus, according to NARA.
Global Migration of ASF
Dr. Sherrilyn Wainwright, APHIS Veterinary Services (VS),
informed webinar attendees that ASF initially entered the nation
of Georgia from Africa in 2007–2009, possibly from a ship. The
virus spread through swill feeding and in wild boar eating food
scraps. Single cases of ASF were detected in Belgium and Czech
Republic, but both countries had a strategic plan and were able
to eradicate the virus before it entered domestic swine. “This has
not occurred in any other countries in Europe or Asia that have
been infected with ASF,” Wainwright said.
The spread of ASF in Europe is due to infection spreading
in the high-density population of wild boar. There is constant
pressure in Poland since the country is having no impact on
controlling the spread. According to Wainwright, Germany
estimates it will be five more years before ASF is eliminated
due to neighboring Estonia showing little control of the spread
and ongoing pressure from western Poland.
China reported ASF in summer 2018 and the virus moved
rapidly. It was originally detected in eight provinces in mid-
October; by February 2020, the virus was in 11 provinces.
Wainwright said the use of illicit vaccines possibly caused a new
form of ASF in China, which is also being underreported, so the
spread is not being properly accounted for there either.
“Unless you know where that virus is, it’s impossible to contain
it,” Wainwright stated. There is continued detections in Russia
on the southeast border with China (no reports of wild boar in
China) and along the northern border of South Korea. Cases of
ASF in western Russia are also being reported, but Russia remains
a “black hole” as reporting is not as complete as expected.
Transmission of ASF and Biosecurity’s Role
“Biosecurity is the single most important thing a producer
can do to protect their herd,” Shere told webinar attendees.
“It must be a daily routine and not turned off and on when
a disease is threatening.” USDA is initiating an ASF public
education campaign in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
Dr. Oriana Beemer, APHIS/VS, said ASF is spread in pigs
by contact with an infected animal’s bodily fluids. It can also
be spread by ticks that feed on infected animals and humans
via clothing or vehicles. The most known source of spread is
movement of live pigs from affected countries and by human
activities such as bringing in pig products from affected
countries, even a ham sandwich, Beemer noted. Introduction
to a farm itself has been tied to animal movement, vehicle
and equipment traveling between farms, and human actions
such as garbage feeding and hunting of wild boar/feral swine
if infected and not separated from farmed animals.
Beemer stated it could take up to 15 days from
introduction of disease before animals show clinical signs,
and several more days for animals to die, meaning it could be
anywhere from 21 to 25 days after introduction for the virus
to be detected and cause alarm, potentially allowing ASF to
spread before even being detected.
“We really can’t underscore how important biosecurity is
before disease sets in,” Beemer said. She added that the key to
national herd protection is reporting animals with suspicious
clinical signs immediately so testing can be performed prior
to animal movement.
Dr. Clayton Johnson, Carthage Veterinarian Service,
said biosecurity is a system of barriers that reduce risk of
introducing a novel pathogen, not a focus on the pathogens
already on the farm. He said to first define the perimeter
to secure and limit the entry point of the location. Good
biosecurity requires robust plans that define critical control
points, such as employee/supply/animal (product) entry,
and animal/product/visitor exit. Can a risk factor for disease
introduction, such as rodents, be excluded? Biosecurity is not a
one-size-fits-all solution, Johnson said. If certain factors cannot
be excluded, installation of good hygiene and sanitation plans
and processes will be needed.
“The disease doesn’t care how it enters a herd or location,”
Johnson explained. “Hygiene and sanitation are important—
invest consistently across risk factors. Good biosecurity
involves many stakeholders e.g., suppliers, vendors and
training, auditing, and motivation. Create a culture of
accountability.”
According to Dr. David Meeker, senior vice president of
NARA scientific services, rendered products pose no risk of ASF
spread unless contaminated with active virus after cooking.
Such contamination could happen to any feed ingredient, but
the likelihood of that occurring in the United States is low.
There is concern, however, about feed ingredients coming from
countries with ASF infections. There are several considerations
for renderers regarding ASF, with the most common concern
being trucks that service farms. Deadstock trucks should not
go directly on to pig farms, according to Meeker. For nearly two
years, a task force of USDA, state veterinarians, pork producers,
packers, and renderers have been involved to determine the
most important steps in planning for a possible ASF infection in
the United States. This effort led to a tabletop exercise recently
in Iowa to test the planning process. After this troubleshooting,
materials will be shared with packers and renderers so all can
efficiently perform biosecurity planning.
“Many diseases could be spread by trucks and pork
producers, so place dead pigs for pick up by renderers outside
the farm boundary,” Meeker told Render. “If the United States
has pig farms infected with ASF, heightened biosecurity will
need to be practiced, which will include truck washing, special
routing, and truck driver cleaning procedures to prevent spread
of virus from infected herds.”
Pam Zaabel, director of swine health, National Pork Board,
reiterated that companies should have a written biosecurity
plan and implement those measures. For help in developing
plans, biosecurity training should be taken and available
resources reviewed in order to determine the best approach.
Continued on page 12
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